What Did The Munich Agreement Decide

… The solution to the Czechoslovakian problem that has just been found is, in my opinion, only the prelude to a larger colony in which all Europe can find peace. This morning I had another meeting with the German Chancellor, Mr. Hitler, and this is the document that bears his name, as well as mine. Some of you may have already heard what it contains, but I`d just like to read it to you: ` … We consider the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German naval agreement as a symbol of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war again. [96] In 1938, opinion polls took their first steps as babies. A British poll conducted just after the Munich conference said it was satisfied with Chamberlain, 33% dissatisfied and 10% undecided. When asked about the rearmament or future management of Nazi Germany, respondents were more belligerent, suggesting much more doubts about justice or the sustainability of peace: 72% supported increased defence spending. 57% may not have been as important, considering the propaganda value of Chamberlain`s shuttle diplomacy and its so-called triumphant conclusion. A less statistically reliable survey of the so-called mass observation system revealed that 40% of them were “revolting” and only 22% approved as of 20 September. The slogan “Above us, without us!” (Czech: O n`s bez n`s!) sums up the feelings of the Czechoslovakian population (Slovakia and the Czech Republic) towards the agreement. [Citation required] On its way to Germany, Czechoslovakia (as the state was renamed) lost its reasonable border with Germany and its fortifications. Without it, its independence became more nominal than more real.

The agreement also caused Czechoslovakia to lose 70% of its steel industry, 70% of its electricity and 3.5 million citizens to Germany. [61] The Sudeten Germans celebrated what they saw as their liberation. The impending war, it seemed, had been averted. The Manchester Guardian covered every corner of history, from the details of the deal Chamberlain, which appeared on the balcony of Buckingham Palace, to unease among other nations. One editorial found that the sheet of paper he was waving on his return to Britain was almost worthless. During the Second World War, British Prime Minister Churchill, who opposed the agreement when it was signed, decided not to abide by the terms of the post-war agreement and to bring the Sudetenland back to post-war Czechoslovakia. On 5 August 1942, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden sent Jan Masaryk the following note: As the threats from Germany and a European war became increasingly evident, opinions changed. Chamberlain was awarded for his role as one of the “Men of Munich” in books such as the Guilty Men of 1940. A rare defence of the wartime accord came in 1944 from Viscount Maugham, who had been the Lord`s chancellor. Maugham regarded the decision to establish a Czechoslovakian state with large German and Hungarian minorities as a “dangerous experiment” in the face of previous disputes and described the agreement, which stemmed mainly from the need for France to free itself from its contractual obligations in the face of its vagueness to war. [63] After the war, Churchill`s memoirs of that time, The Gathering Storm (1948), claimed that Chamberlain`s appeasement of Hitler had been wrong in Munich, and noted Churchill`s pre-war warnings about Hitler`s plan of attack and Britain`s folly of disarmament after Germany reached air parity with Britain.

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