More than a year after the agreement with Russia, British and French representatives, Sir Mark Sykes and François Georges Picot, have drafted another secret agreement on the future spoils of the First World War. Picot represented a small group determined to ensure France`s control of Syria; For its part, Sykes asked the United Kingdom to compensate for the influence in the region. The deal largely overlooked the future growth of Arab nationalism, which the British government and military used to their advantage against the Turks. Hussein`s letter of 18 February 1916 appealed to McMahon for £50,000 in gold, plus weapons, ammunition and food, stating that Feisal was awaiting the arrival of “no less than 100,000 people” for the planned revolt, and McMahon`s reply of 10 March 1916 confirmed British approval of the questions and closed the ten letters of correspondence. In April and May, discussions were launched by Sykes on the benefits of a meeting in which Picot and the Arabs were to participate in order to articulate the desiderate of the two sides. At the same time, logistics were managed in relation to the promised revolt and Hussein`s impatience with the measures increased. Finally, at the end of April, McMahon was informed of Sykes-Picot`s terms and he and Grey agreed that they would not be communicated to the Arabs.  :57-60 The Sykes-Picot agreement was in direct contradiction to the promises of freedom that the British made to the Arabs in exchange for their support for the collapse of the Ottomans. It will be necessary to prevent regional actors from trying to sink the contours of a proposal in order to position external powers against each other and leave the region in chaos. It is therefore essential to reach at least a broad agreement and/or agreement between the US, Russia and the EU. Only then will important regional states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran and Turkey be called. In the third phase, some local players are asked to give their consent.
Loevy makes a similar point with regard to sections 4 to 8 of the agreement and refers to the British and French who practiced “Ottoman colonial development as insiders” and that this experience served as a roadmap for subsequent war negotiations.  while Khalidi highlighted Britain`s and France`s negotiations on the homs-Baghdad railways in 1913 and 1914, as well as their agreements with Germany in other regions, as a “clear basis” for their subsequent spheres of influence under the agreement.  The real question is not whether any of these solutions would be desirable, but whether any of them could become a reality on the ground. . . .